Organizing the 21st Century White House

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Since the writing of the Constitution, the presidency has been transformed from a small institution primarily concerned with executing public policy and conducting foreign relations to a huge organization of thousands of professionals that dominates the politics and government of the United States. The presidency of today is the result of major shifts in US politics and government of the late 20th century. The White House Office has grown from several personal advisers in the Roosevelt administration to the huge bureaucracy of specialists that it is today. This chapter will analyze the effects of these shifts on the internal management of the presidency by examining three major trends: 1) centralization, 2) the office of chief of staff, and 3) the role of the vice president.

For most of American history, cabinet secretaries were the main advisers of presidents, but since the mid-twentieth century they have been eclipsed by the growing White House staff. Rather than delegating responsibilities to cabinet secretaries and depending on them for advice, Presidents now rely on their White House aides who are much closer, physically and symbolically. With larger White House staffs, presidents have had to pay more attention to managing their own offices. The management and control job is now too large for the president to handle, and the office of chief of staff has developed to fill that role, among others. Perhaps the most important development in recent presidents has been in the role of the vice president. Even though the vice presidency of Richard Cheney will probably not be duplicated in the future, he set important precedents that will have a significant impact on future presidencies.

Centralizing Control in the White House

Before the mid-20th century, presidents had staff help, but they tended to be personal advisers, generalists, and performers of clerical chores who were often relatives. Their primary advisers on policy were members of their cabinets, the secretaries of the major departments of the government. But since the emergence of a professional White House staff after World War II, presidential aides now dominate administration policy making.

After the Great Depression and World War II the role of the federal government had grown tremendously, and President Eisenhower institutionalized the White House staff in important ways, by creating the office of chief of staff and designing offices with specialized functions, for example the Office of Legislative Liaison. Eisenhower, however, continued to rely primarily on his cabinet secretaries for advice. He used the cabinet as a policy consulting body that would advise him on the large questions of administration policy, and he held regular cabinet meetings to solicit their advice. He created a cabinet secretariat to prepare agendas for cabinet meetings and for follow up with implementation. He also delegated a range of discretion to cabinet heads to influence and implement policies in their areas of jurisdiction.
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson rejected the role the cabinet played in the Eisenhower administration and began to use White House staffers as their chief advisers on major policy priorities. By the end of the Johnson administration, the role of the federal government had again expanded, with the War on Poverty and Great Society programs. In reaction to this growth in executive branch programs, President Nixon sought to rein in the bureaucracies and impose presidential control on policy implementation. He suspected that career civil servants were committed to the policies of Democratic social programs; he even suspected that his own cabinet appointees were too sympathetic to the programs they were charged with implementing. In response, Nixon began to centralize policy making in the White House staff. The national security staff was increased significantly under Henry Kissinger, who centralized all major foreign policy initiatives under his control. On the domestic policy side, John Ehrlichman recruited a large White House staff for the Domestic Policy Council. The effect of these institutional innovations was to give the White House staff the capacity to conduct policy development independent of the policy experts in the departments and agencies of the executive branch. The number of White House staffers consequently increased from 250 to more than 500.

Presidents Ford and Carter initially sought to rein in the White House staff and rely primarily on their cabinet secretaries for policy advice. But they were soon disillusioned by what their own staffers saw as policy advocacy from cabinet members that was not closely enough attuned to White House priorities. Each of them reacted by centralizing control in their White House staffs and increasing the size and capacity of the White House Office. President Reagan, with a clear set of priorities, continued to centralize control in the White House, and expanded that control to political appointees throughout the executive branch. The George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations, with fourteen cabinet departments, followed suit.

In remarks about her eight years as Secretary of Health and Human Services during the Clinton administration, Donna Shalala illustrated the common attitude of cabinet secretaries toward the White House staff. She was asked about the effect of the impeachment of the president on her cabinet department. She replied that it made her job much easier because the White House staff was so absorbed in impeachment proceeding that it left her alone to manage her department: “He got distracted and we got focused.”

By the end of the 20th century the number of personnel within the Executive Office of the President totaled more than 2,000. The capacity of the White House to develop policy was firmly established; and the primary advisers to the president were in the White House staff, not the cabinet.

**President Bush and Centralization**

Despite President George W. Bush’s care in recruiting an experienced and well-credentialed cabinet, he was not about to reverse the trend of the past four decades of power gravitating to the White House. Early in his administration, all of the major policy priorities were dominated by White House staffers rather than led from the cabinet. As one high level White House official characterized his approach: “The Bush brand is few priorities, run out of the White House, with no *interference* from the Cabinet. . . . The function of the Bush Cabinet is to provide a chorus of support for White House policies and technical expertise for implementing
them” (emphasis added).²

When President Bush was inaugurated in 2001, he had designated his whole cabinet and had a fully functioning White House staff read to run administration policy making. For instance, the administration’s education initiative was handled by the domestic policy adviser, Margaret LaMontagne Spellings rather than Education Secretary Roderick Paige, who had been. On medical issues, such as government financing of prescription drugs, the patients’ bill of rights, and stem-cell research, the action was in the White House rather than with Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson. The administration’s tax cut proposals were not led by Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill but by White House staffers, particularly the National Economic Council director, Lawrence Lindsey. Vice President Cheney dominated the administration’s energy policy proposals rather than Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham.³

The centralization of control in the Bush White House was reinforced by its reaction to the atrocities of 9/11 that led to the primacy of national security policy for administration. National security policy was tightly controlled by Vice President Cheney, who acted as Bush’s prime minister or, in effect, the chief operating officer. This was as President Bush wanted it; his approach to governing was to keep his eye on the big picture and delegate implementation and details to others.

President Bush’s style of leadership was to articulate a vision, set priorities, and then delegate implementation to his Vice President and his loyal staff team. In his autobiography, A Charge to Keep, he put it this way: “My job is to set the agenda and tone and framework, to lay out the principles by which we operate and make decisions, and then delegate much of the process to them.”⁴ President Bush preferred short memos, oral briefings, and crisp meetings. His circle of advisers was relatively small. According to President of the American Enterprise Institute, Christopher DeMuth, “It’s a too tightly managed decision-making process. When they make decisions, a very small number of people are in the room, and it has a certain effect of constricting the range of alternatives being offered.”⁵

His White House staff was legendary for its tight message discipline and absence of unauthorized leaks. President Bush saw himself as the one who listens to advice and then makes the tough calls. “I listen to all voices, but mine is the final decision. . . . I’m the decider, and I decide what’s best.”⁶ In contrast to his father or Bill Clinton, who would agonize over important decisions, Bush would decide and move on. The detached Bush style resembled the style of President Reagan, but it contrasted sharply with those of Presidents Clinton, and Obama, who delved into the details of policies and played active roles in policymaking.

Bush described his personal approach to decision making as intuitive: “I can only go by my instincts.” He did not believe in elaborate deliberation or in explaining his thinking to his White House staff. As he told Bob Woodward: “I’m the commander – see, I don’t need to explain – I do not need to explain why I say things. That’s the interesting thing about being the president. Maybe somebody needs to explain to me why they say something, but I don’t feel like I owe anybody an explanation”⁷ In contrast to President Bush, Barak Obama had a much more regularized policy process, approached decisions analytically, and was collaborative in his deliberations; but he agreed with Bush on centralized White House control.
President Obama and Centralization

President Obama began his administration with the intention of running all major policy initiatives out of the White House, with the exception of legal policy on detainees, which he delegated to his attorney general and friend, Eric Holder. Obama’s experiment with delegation foundered at the hands of the White House staff, illustrating the imperative of centralized White House control of policy. President Obama was criticized for his use of policy “czars” in his White House staff to coordinate policies that cut across the jurisdictions of different departments. Predictably, these political realities were resented by his cabinet and denounced by external critics.

Cabinet secretaries in the Obama administration often resented their treatment by Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel, who they felt treated them as his “minions” rather than as major administration officials. They were required to send weekly reports to Emanuel, who returned them with specific comments and instructions. As in other administrations, cabinet secretaries often felt that the president paid too much attention to his inner circle of campaigners (in this case his campaign loyalists Valerie Jarret, David Axelrod, and Robert Gibbs) and did not grant enough access to old Washington hands and cabinet officials.

The administration intended from the very beginning to handle its signature policy priority, health care financing reform, in the White House. During the transition, when Obama asked former Senate leader Tom Daschle to be secretary of Health and Human Services, Daschle insisted that he also be designated as the White House czar of health care reform. The request for this unique designation reflected Daschle’s understanding that the real action in policy making would take place in the White House rather than in cabinet departments. When Daschle withdrew his nomination because of tax problems, Obama appointed Nancy-Ann DeParle to be White House health czar and former Governor of Kansas, Kathleen Sebelius, to head HHS. In testimony before Congress in early February 2010, Sebelius admitted her secondary role in health care reform. “I am not a principal in the negotiations, nor is my staff.” She said that they would provide “technical support” to Congress but they did not play a role in negotiating over the shape of the health care legislation.

There were exceptions to White House centralization and resentment of members of the cabinet. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, took the lead on administration financial policy, though Lawrence Summers, the Council of Economic Advisers, and Rahm Emanuel were equally important. Robert Gates and Hillary Clinton were often at the White House and influenced foreign and national security policy. In all administrations the “inner cabinet” of the original four departments of Defense, State, Treasury, and Justice are closer to the president, particularly if they are headed by personal friends of the president.

The exception that proved the rule of centralized White House control was Obama’s initial intention to delegate the legal aspects of detainee policy to his attorney general, Eric Holder. Holder accepted the position with the understanding that he would make legal decisions independently of the White House, though of course the president would have the final say. President Obama also wanted to be seen as not letting politics interfere with legal principles.
Thus he delegated some of the key legal decisions regarding detainee policy to Attorney General Holder. Obama told Holder to make decisions on the merits of the law rather than on political grounds. Exercising his delegated authority, Holder decided to try the 9/11 terrorist suspects in criminal court rather than military tribunals, and he chose New York City as the venue. The decision caused a political uproar, with congressional leaders threatening legislation to mandate military commission trials and New York Mayor Blumberg backing off of his initial support of Holder’s venue decision. Thus Obama faced the dilemma of backing the initial decision of Holder about the best legal strategy for handling detainees or bowing to political pressure.

Holder’s decisions reinforced White House staffers’ suspicion that he was not sufficiently sensitive to the president’s political interests. Holder was aware of the conflict and tried to maintain a balance. “I hope that whatever decision I make would not have a negative impact on the president’s agenda. But that can’t be a part of my decision.”11 White House staffers, however, felt that Holder was more concerned with his own legal reputation than the political success of the president. According to a lawyer close to the Obama White House, White House staffers “think he wants to protect his own image, and to make himself untouchable politically, the way Reno did, by doing the righteous thing.”12 Political aides in the White House were so concerned about what they considered Holder’s tin ear for politics that they suggested appointing a “minder” in the Justice Department who had more sensitive “political antennae” than Holder.13

Ultimately, the White House staff, particularly chief of staff Emanuel convinced Obama that the political repercussions of Holder’s decisions were more important than Holder’s legal judgments and his independence from the White House. Obama in the spring of 2009 decided that some detainees would be tried in civil courts, but most would be tried by military commissions or detained indefinitely without trial. Thus ended Obama’s experiment with delegation of policy making to cabinet secretaries. The centralization of control of high-visibility legal policy in the White House illustrates pressures faced by all contemporary presidents to ensure that departmental perspectives do not undercut broader presidential interests.

During his first year, Obama also wanted tight, personal control over national security policy making. According to one senior aide, “President Obama is his own Henry Kissinger – no one else plays that role. . . .This president wants all the trains routed through the Oval Office.”14 By the end of his first year in office the Obama White House had established a “regular order” for the national security policy process. There was a systematic set of procedures for paper flow, consultation, and sign-off; the process was managed and enforced by deputy NSC adviser Tom Donilon and Rahm Emanuel. The daily 9:30am national security briefings were conducted by Donilon, who also ran the “deputies meetings” of the NSC, the heart of the interagency process. Reflecting his centrality to the national security policy process, Donilon became national security adviser when General Jones retired. Obama’s personal engagement went so far as to assert his control of the details of Afghanistan policy by personally dictating the November 2009 policy memorandum that specified the 30,000 troop buildup in Afghanistan.

One of the essential roles of White House staffers is to coordinate administration policy that spans more than one department of the executive branch. The need is based on the reality that “where you stand depends on where you sit.” That is, one’s stance on a policy issue is heavily influenced by one’s official position. For instance, secretaries of State will predictably
be concerned primarily with diplomacy, and secretaries of Defense will primarily be concerned with military policy. Their advice to the president on foreign policy issues will necessarily reflect their formal roles and duties. The president, however, must take into account both diplomatic and military factors in making policy. With the complexity of foreign policy issues, it is imperative for the president to get advice from staffers whose perspective is presidential rather than tied to one department. The growth of the national security council staff in the White House reflects this reality. The role of national security adviser is now firmly established in the White House, and it is broadly seen as legitimate and necessary. Yet President Obama was severely criticized by members of Congress for establishing “czars” in other policy areas. Though all modern presidents have had White House staffers who acted as policy “czars,” President Obama designated more of them than previous presidents.15

The term “czar” has no generally accepted definition within the context of American government. It is a term loosely used by journalists to refer to members of a president’s administration who seem to be in charge of a particular policy area. More accurately, the term “czar” in the American context refers to members of the White House staff who have been designated by the president to coordinate specific policy areas that involve more than one department or agency. In contrast to officers of the United States, such as cabinet secretaries, members of the White House staff are appointed by the president without Senate confirmation. They are legally authorized only to advise the president; they cannot make authoritative decisions for the government of the United States.

The most controversial of Obama’s czars were White House staff appointees who were charged with or perceived as exercising authority in executing the law that only officers of the government should have, such as cabinet secretaries and other senate-confirmed positions. For instance, he designated a Director of Recovery for Auto Communities and Workers to direct funds from the economic stimulus legislation to help communities affected by the near collapse of the auto industry. He also appointed a “car czar” to distribute money provided for saving General Motors and Chrysler from bankruptcy. There were also several coordinators of policy toward major bodies of water that affected several states, such as the Great Lakes and the Chesapeake Bay. In a questionable tactic, Obama appointed Elizabeth Warren (later Senator) to help establish the newly created Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. The problem was that because Warren could not overcome Republican opposition to her appointment, Obama tried to skirt the constitutional requirement of Senate confirmation by appointing her to the White House staff.16

In another example, Carol Browner (head of EPA in the Clinton administration) was tasked with overseeing administration agencies concerned with energy and climate change. These agencies included the White House Council on Environmental Quality, the Environmental Protection Agency, as well as the departments of Energy, Defense, and Interior. In announcing his choice of Browner, Obama described the role that he expected White House czars to play; she would provide “coordination across the government” and ensure “my personal engagement as president” in environmental policy. He said that she would have authority to “demand integration among different agencies; cooperation between federal, state and local governments; and partnership with the private sector.”17
Aside from constitutional issues, the managerial problem with White House czars is that they confuse the chain of command and leave open the question of who is in charge of administration policy. Czars are often frustrated because they lack the authority to carry out their responsibilities. That is, they do not control budgets or appointments, and they cannot order cabinet secretaries to do their bidding. For example, past drug czars (heads of the Office of National Drug Control Policy) expressed frustration because they could not authoritatively coordinate the FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration, Coast Guard, HUD, and other agencies that implement drug control policies.

Thus President Obama continued the 20th century trend of centralizing control in the White House staff, ensuring the frustration of cabinet secretaries. But in the modern presidency, coordination of administration policy from the president’s perspective is essential. The challenge is to maintain a healthy balance between too much centralization and the opposite problem of lack of coordination of policy making and implementation in departments and agencies.

White House Organization and the Chief of Staff

Along with the great expansion of the role of the national government in the United States, came the increase of the numbers of people who serve the president rather than work in a department or agency. With hundreds of professionals in the White House Office divided into their own areas of expertise (e.g. national security, personnel recruitment, legislative liaison, communications, etc.), internal control and coordination became essential.

President Eisenhower established the office of chief of staff early in his first term, based on his military experience. The main task of chief of staff Sherman Adams was to keep issues off the president’s desk unless they clearly needed presidential attention. The White House had a clear hierarchy, and Adams was at the top of it, guarding access to the president. In contrast, John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson ran their White Houses with an advisory model that was more “collegial,” meaning that there was no strict hierarchical control of White House staffers and a number of staffers reporting to the president directly. The hierarchical model creates a more orderly White House, though it narrows the perspectives that the president receives. The collegial model allows more access to the president from staffers with different perspectives, but at the cost of increased presidential time and attention.

With the sharp increase in the numbers of staffers and their expanded role in the presidency during the Nixon administration, the collegial model of organization became untenable. H.R. Haldeman was Nixon’s chief of staff and ruled the White House with an iron hand. He controlled access to the president, with the exception of Henry Kissinger, and he controlled all presidential papers and access to the president. Presidents Ford and Carter each tried to run the White House using the collegial model, but both gave up in frustration. The size of the White House staff and its expanded functions created the need for someone short of the president to be in charge. After trying to run the White House by himself, President Ford concluded that working without a chief of staff “is putting too big a burden on the president himself. You need a filter, a person that you have total confidence in who works so closely with
you that in effect his is almost an alter ego. I just can’t imagine a president not having an effective chief of staff.”

The role of chief of staff that developed in the 20th century was to impose order on the policy process, manage the White House staff, deal with conflicts among members of the cabinet, advise the president, and make the trains run on time. But in recent administrations, presidents have also expected their chiefs of staff to take more public roles as spokespersons for the administration, negotiating with Congress, setting the policy agenda, and providing outreach to key constituencies. This was particularly evident in President Obama’s chiefs of staff, though not in the Bush administration, as will be explained below.

President Bush’s White House

At the beginning of his administration, President Bush appointed Andrew Card as his chief of staff. Card was an experienced Washington insider and Bush loyalist since 1980. He had worked in the White House for Ronald Reagan and had been deputy chief of staff to John Sununu in the George H. W. Bush administration before being appointed Secretary of Transportation; he also ran the 2000 Republican National Convention for George W. Bush. Card served admirably in directing routine processes and work flow in the White House and acting as a trusted adviser to the president. But the Bush White House was so dominated by Vice President Cheney that Card could not play the traditional role of chief of staff. This section will analyze the dominant role Vice President Cheney played in the Bush White House. The factors that allowed him to do so will be covered in the section on the vice presidency.

Before he became vice president, Richard Cheney had emphasized the importance of a regular and disciplined policy process in the White House. “The process of moving paper in and out of the Oval Office, who gets involved in the meetings, who does the president listen to, who gets a chance to talk to him before he makes a decision, is absolutely critical. It has to be managed in such a way that it has integrity.” Dick Cheney well understood the importance of a regularized policy development process to the President’s understanding of a broad range of policy options. “It’s very, very important when you set up shop to make certain that you have a guaranteed flow . . . that everybody’s got their shot at the decision memo. You know if there’s going to be a meeting, the right people are going to be in the meeting, that the president has a chance to listen to all of that and then make a decision.”

When Cheney became vice president, however, he was able to exploit the lack of a regularized policy process to his own advantage. In some of the most important policy decisions of the Bush presidency Cheney circumvented any regularized process. On domestic issues Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill thought that the Bush White House had no serious domestic policy process. “It was a broken process . . . or rather no process at all; there seemed to be no apparatus to assess policy and deliberate effectively, to create coherent governance.

In the policy areas that mattered to Cheney – business, environment, national security, budget, and executive power under the Constitution – he dominated administration policy. For instance, in environmental policy he engineered the reversal of one of President Bush’s campaign positions. EPA Director Christine Todd Whitman, who had cleared her the issue with
Andrew Card, gave a speech at an international conference, committing the U.S. to a policy to reduce carbon emissions. When Cheney heard about the speech, he convinced President Bush to sign a letter to members of Congress that in effect reversed his position. The policy change was not cleared with the EPA or the State Department before Bush signed the letter and, which undercut Whitman. After further frustration with the vice president’s office, Whitman resigned from the administration.\(^{22}\)

On the national security side of policy making, Cheney and his staffers were able to get the president’s approval without subjecting their policy preferences to the scrutiny of those in the administration who ordinarily would be expected to provide advice to the president.

For instance, the Military Commissions Order of November 13, 2001 was secretly prepared by Cheney advisers and kept secret from others in the administration, who normally would have important expertise to bear on the legal and military issues, such as Secretary of State Colin Powell and National security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. When Attorney General John Ashcroft saw a draft of the order, he was upset that the Justice Department would not have a role in deciding which terrorist suspects would be tried by military commission and which in the criminal justice system. When he went to the White House to object, he found that the Vice President was in charge of the order and that John Yoo of the Office of Legal Counsel, nominally Ashcroft’s subordinate, had recommended that the U.S. court system be avoided. Ashcroft wanted to see the president personally about the issue, but Cheney denied him access to the president.\(^{23}\)

Normally, such an important policy document would be staffed out and routed through other White House and administration officials. But Cheney personally took the document to President Bush in his private dining room to clear it with him and subsequently to sign it. White House aides present said they did not know that the vice president had been involved in drafting the memo. Thus Cheney had engineered President Bush’s approval and signature without any regular policy process or sign-off by relevant White House and Cabinet officials.

Similarly, President Bush’s decision to declare that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the US war with al Qaeda was engineered by Cheney’s aide, David Addington, over the objections of State Department lawyers. When Secretary of State Powell, who was out of the country, heard that Bush was ready to sign the document suspending the Geneva Conventions, he returned and demanded a formal NSC meeting to discuss the issue.\(^{24}\) Powell objected to the decision because he considered it abandoning an important US obligation and might lead to the mistreatment of US soldiers in the future. Powell’s arguments, however, were undercut when the vice president’s office leaked counter arguments refuting Powell’s points to the conservative newspaper, the \textit{Washington Times} newspaper before the meeting. The newspaper article implied that Powell was caving in to pressure from the political left. President Bush rejected Powell’s plea for reconsidering the issue and signed the memorandum on February 7, 2002.

This decision was important because suspending US compliance with the Geneva Conventions constituted the renunciation of a treaty and led to the torture and abuse of detainees in the war on terror.\(^{25}\) Vice President Cheney had been successful in excluding from the early decision process those who might have disagreed with his draft of the order; he got his way, but
the decision led to a flawed legal framework for dealing with detainees in the war on terror. The consequences of excluding outside input on the decision came when the Supreme Court, in *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*, struck down the military commissions plan because they were not authorized in accord with United States law or the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

The vice president also steered administration intelligence policy. One important administration initiative was kept secret from most of the top White House staffers and almost led to the resignation of Bush appointees at the Justice Department. The secret Terrorist Surveillance Program conducted by the National Security Agency was designed to intercept suspected terrorist communications within the United States without going through the warrants required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The legal justification for the program was written by Cheney lawyer David Addington but kept secret from those running the program as well as most other national security officials in the administration.26

After reviewing the dubious legal reasoning justifying the program, Attorney General John Ashcroft refused to sign off on an extension of the program unless it was changed to comply with the law. When it became clear that a number of top Bush appointees in the Justice Department were ready to resign if the program went forward unchanged, Cheney did not tell the president. It was only when Bush met personally with acting attorney general James Comey (Ashcroft was in the hospital) that the president understood the extent of the Department of Justice objections and decided to make changes in the program. That Cheney did not make the president aware of the impending resignations, illustrates how pervasive Cheney’s control of White House policy and process was.

Chief of staff Andrew Card was replaced by Joshua Bolton for the last two years of the Bush administration. Even though the power of the vice president Cheney had waned a bit, Bolton was not able to play the role of the traditional, strong chief of staff. The broader point of these examples is to illustrate the reality that Vice President Cheney so dominated the Bush administration in most important areas of policy making that the chief of staff was relegated to the routine processes of administration rather than the usual role of presidential chiefs of staff. With the coming of the Obama administration in 2009, the chief of staff role returned to its earlier prominence.

**President Obama’s Chiefs of Staff**

Shortly after his election, President-elect Obama designated Rahm Emanuel to be his chief of staff. It was clear from the beginning that Emanuel would be a traditional strong chief of staff as he oversaw the recruitment of other White House staffers and President Obama’s selection of cabinet secretaries. Emanuel and his successors as chief of staff fit with Obama’s desire to have an orderly policy process in the White House. Lawrence Summers, Obama’s chief economic adviser, noted Obama’s White House “stands out for having both intense presidential involvement and reasonable organizational order.”27 As Summers mentioned, Obama engaged himself in the details of policy, though the hierarchical model of White House organization was modified by the direct access of several close advisers (David Axelrod, Valarie Jarrett, and Tom Donilon) who did not have to go through Emanuel to reach the president.
Emanuel had experience as deputy chief of staff in the Clinton administration and was a member of the House of Representative, and rising in the Democratic leadership when Obama convinced him to join his administration. The chief of staff role in any presidency is a formidable task; and it would be particularly difficult in Obama’s high-maintenance White House staff structure. Emanuel would have to ride herd on the many policy czars, smooth ruffled feathers, corral large egos, guard access to the president, make the trains run on time, negotiate between White House staffers and cabinet secretaries, and get all of the separate political and policy threads to go through the eye of the needle at the same time.

By all accounts, Emanuel was up to the job. In addition to his impressive political experience, Emanuel was known for his abrasive personality, vulgar language, volatile temperament and tactical brilliance. He represented the “Tammany Hall” part of the White House staff which favored practical political victories. His approach occasionally conflicted with the “keepers of the flame” who had been with Obama for years and worked in his campaign. These were the idealists who wanted Obama to hold true to his campaign values and work for large-scale social change. Each side represented one aspect of the president’s mind. Emanuel specialized in what he called “the art of the possible,” and he was a master of “transactional politics,” that is, making deals and compromises, rather than approaching policy from an ideological perspective.

Emanuel was central to the Obama administration in its first year in office, acting as a primary lobbyist of Congress, major liaison with the Washington Press corps, and traffic cop in the White House. Emanuel’s office was the nerve center of the White House, with all paperwork and policy advice required to run the gauntlet of Emanuel’s scrutiny before going to the president. Emanuel was central to all of Obama’s major policy decisions and negotiations with Congress. He was not a “neutral” broker in his advice to Obama, and his preferred policy positions tended to favor tactical judgments rather than ideological convictions, in contrast to Vice President Cheney in the Bush administration.

Emanuel was seen by Obama critics as the root of flawed Obama policies. Critics on the right saw him as an advocate of big government and partisanship; critics on the left saw him as being too willing to betray Obama’s campaign promises and compromise with Republicans. He was attacked for being one of the Chicago insiders who supposedly insulated Obama from broader sources of advice. He was also defended for being a realist who tried to save Obama from idealistic policies (such as the closing of Guantanamo, the civil trials of 9/11 suspects, and comprehensive health care reform) favored by his supporters on the left.

Emanuel’s style as chief of staff can perhaps be best illustrated by contrasting him with his temporary successor, Pete Rouse. A month before the midterm elections in 2010, Emanuel announced that he was leaving the White House to return to Chicago to run for mayor, a long-time goal of his. When Emanuel left, President Obama appointed his former Senate chief of staff, Pete Rouse, as to fill Emanuel’s shoes. Rouse had previously served as chief of staff to Senator Thomas Daschle; he was so skilled in his job that he was known as the “101st Senator.” Rouse had been with the White House from the beginning of the administration as a “senior adviser” to the President. His duties were not fixed, but ranged across White House trouble
spots, particularly friction among staffers. Rouse intended to be “acting” chief of staff until Obama named a formal replacement for Emanuel.

In temperament Rouse was much more similar to Obama than to Emanuel. He was low-key rather than histrionic; in contrast to Emanuel, and he seldom or never use foul language. Perhaps the President summed it up best when he praised Rouse as “completely ego-free.” Rouse was thus much more of an honest broker, internal manager, and behind-the-scenes actor than was Emanuel, who had strong views on policy issues and how they related to political realities.

After the 2010 elections in which Republicans swept the elections, picking up 6 seats in the Senate and 63 seats in the House, President Obama appointed William Daley of Chicago to take over the chief of staff job. Daley had been Secretary of Commerce in the Clinton administration, had pushed the NAFTA agreement through Congress against Democratic opposition, and had subsequently been a business executive. His background seemed well suited to mend Obama relations with the business community, and he was seen as a moderate Democrat who would better fit the public mood after the 2010 Republican electoral victories.

Daley was also expected to mend fences with the cabinet. Cabinet secretaries continued to complain that Emanuel relegated them to minor roles and kept them from advising the president about their portfolios. Emanuel was seen as unrelentingly negative, hectoring, and attempting to micromanage them. They also complained about the White House staff “czars” who kept them away from the president. In addition to Daley’s appointment, the White House also created a “Cabinet Communications Director,” in order to “better coordinate with and utilize members of the Cabinet.” Daley was also expected to play a more public role, acting as a “public surrogate” for President Clinton, according to David Axelrod.

Over the next year, Daley was able to placate the cabinet, but was not as successful at coordinating the White House staff, which continued to be dominated by the inner circle of those closest to the President from early campaign day. Daley also alienated Democrats on the Hill by publicly saying that, “Both Democrats and Republicans have really made it very difficult for the president to be anything like a chief executive.” In addition, on Daley’s watch, White House negotiations with House Republicans for a “grand bargain” on deficit reduction had failed to yield a solution in the summer of 2011 (though this could hardly be blamed on Daley).

As a result, in October 2011 Obama shifted Daley’s role to liaison with the cabinet and outside visitors. Pete Rouse was again tasked with the more traditional chief of staff role of handling the White House staff and making the trains run on time. The shift may also have foreshadowed the president’s strategy for the coming election year during which he would back away from courting Republicans in the House and the business community and make a more populist appeal to the electorate.

In January 2012 Obama appointed his OMB director, Jack Lew, to be his new chief of staff. Lew had been OMB director in the Clinton administration, and he was Hillary Clinton’s deputy secretary of state for management and resources in the Obama administration. Given his expertise and experience, Lew was expected to play an important role in negotiating with
Congress over deficit reduction. Lew was also seen as a progressive and in tune with President Obama’s policy priorities for the election year. Lew’s role as negotiator was emphasized by President Obama, who said, “Jack’s economic advice has been invaluable and he has my complete trust, both because of his mastery of the numbers but because of the values behind those numbers.”

Obama’s chiefs of staff returned the position to its more traditional role as presidential enforcer and master of the White House policy process. The aberration in the development of the office represented by the Bush administration, is not likely to be repeated in future presidencies. The reasons for this are due to the unique talents and background brought to the Bush White House by Vice President Cheney, as will be explained below.

The Rise of the Vice Presidency

Through the middle of the 20th century, the Vice Presidency had been seen as a secondary office, without much power associated with it and a source of frustration to its occupants. John Adams called it the “most insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived or his imagination conceived.” Harry Truman was not even informed of the Manhattan Project until after Franklin Roosevelt was dead. President Eisenhower relegated Richard Nixon to international travel and ceremonial duties, and when asked in 1960 to name Nixon’s contributions to his presidency said “If you give me a week, I might think of one. I don’t remember.” Lyndon Johnson was looked down upon by John Kennedy’s staffers, and in the last year of his presidency he did not let Hubert Humphrey participate in deliberations about Vietnam. Spiro Agnew was driven to resign from the Nixon administration by revelations of his corruption, and Nelson Rockefeller was sidelined by Gerald Ford’s chiefs of staff, Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Cheney.

Part of the reason for this unforeseen reality of American politics was that vice presidents were often chosen for electoral reasons to “balance the ticket,” with the vice presidential candidate expected to please a particular constituency or represent an important faction of the political party that the presidential candidate wanted to court. At times, the vice president was the presidential candidate’s main rival for the nomination. Once in office, presidential staffs often viewed the vice president as a potential rival to the president and carefully ensured that publicity or credit for public policies accrued to the president. Friction was exacerbated when vice presidential staffs felt that their principal was being sidelined and shut out of important policy deliberations.

It was President Jimmy Carter, however, who transformed the office of vice president when he chose Walter Mondale as his Vice President in 1976. Carter did not choose Mondale for electoral reasons but for personal compatibility, Washington experience, and substantive expertise. Carter valued Mondale’s advice, met with him regularly, and gave Mondale important, trouble-shooting assignments. Carter reinforced his personal judgments with important resources, not available to vice presidents in the past: an office in the West Wing with easy access to the Oval Office, the right to attend any White House meeting, integration of some staff between the president and vice president, and access to document distribution within the White House.
These precedents were extended to subsequent vice presidents, though Vice Presidents George H.W. Bush and Dan Quayle were not accorded the same access or assignments from Presidents Reagan or Bush. The enhanced vice presidency was continued when Bill Clinton chose Al Gore for personal compatibility and substantive expertise. Gore played important roles in the Clinton administration on environmental issues, national defense, telecommunications policy, and the National Performance Review management initiative.

The Cheney Vice Presidency

By the time that Richard Cheney became vice president, the office had become institutionalized with an enlarged staff and the precedents mentioned above. But Cheney brought with him unique characteristics and experience that enabled him to dominate much of the important policy making in the administration of George W. Bush, as illustrated in previous sections above. 38

Dick Cheney had much broader governmental and foreign policy experience than had President Bush or most other presidential candidates, for that matter (excluding vice presidential experience). He had been a congressional staffer, worked at the Office of Economic Opportunity, was deputy chief of staff to President Ford (at the age of 30), and became chief of staff when Donald Rumsfeld was appointed Secretary of Defense. Later he represented Wyoming in the House of Representatives and was Secretary of Defense in the George H.W. Bush administration. In addition, he had business experience as chief executive of the large engineering firm, Halliburton. All of these professional experiences, none of which President Bush had, gave him invaluable advantages when he became vice president.

Cheney conducted George Bush’s search for a vice presidential running mate, and after a lengthy vetting of a number of possible nominees, accepted Bush’s offer to become his vice presidential running mate. Immediately after the election, despite the lack of a declared winner, Cheney got a head start in organizing the Bush administration when he was put in charge of the transition and set up his headquarters in Arlington, VA. He used his extensive contacts to place people throughout the government at subcabinet levels people with whom he had worked before and who would be loyal to him.

From the beginning, Cheney worked on integrating his own staff as fully as possible with the president’s own staff. In an important stroke, he had the budget categories of the office of the president and vice president merged into a single executive office, symbolically and fiscally combining the power of the two offices. As the White House organization was established, Cheney assured that none of the previous privileges accorded to vice presidents were lost, and he went further than any other vice presidents by merging some of his staffers with those of the president. Two of his staffers were accorded the highest staff title in the White House, assistant to the president, and two became deputy assistants to the president. This ensured that his people would have access to all policy meetings and guarantee that Cheney would never be out of the loop in policy making. Cheney also established a parallel staff structure with counterparts to presidential staffers on his own staff. After two months, Cheney had a staff of 85 for national security alone as well as a separate congressional relations staff. 39
Cheney was not interested in social policies, such as faith based initiatives, abortion, cell research, gay marriage, etc., and he left those issues to President Bush’s staff. The policy areas that Cheney focused on, and often dominated, included national security, intelligence, environment, business regulation, judicial appointments, tax policy, and budget issues. According to Cheney, President Bush told him, “I’d have the opportunity to be a major participant in the process, to get involved in whatever issues I wanted to get involved in.”

One factor contributing to Cheney’s power was his declaration that he was not interested in any further political office, that is, running for the presidency after President Bush’s terms. This made him seem less of a threat to steal the limelight from President Bush. The president enjoyed the public dimensions of politics, which Cheney eschewed, leaving Cheney to work on the details of policy making and implementation.

Cheney’s role in the Bush administration fit well with President Bush’s management style. Like President Reagan, but unlike presidents Clinton and Obama, George Bush saw himself as a big-picture leader willing to delegate details and implementation to others. This played to Cheney’s strength, which was policy substance. His mastery of policy substance and detail allowed Cheney to heavily influence the Bush policy agenda and frame issues for the president. His influence was enhanced by his ability to reach several layers down into the bureaucracy to tilt policy recommendations so that when they reached the president, his influence was not obvious and he could present his own recommendations to the president with a light hand. For instance, Cheney would preview the President’s daily intelligence briefing and influence how issues were presented to the president, with Cheney present.

As a consequence of Cheney’s experience, his personal network in the administration, his staff and personal expertise, access to the President, and the lack of a regularized policy process, the vice president was able to dominate the Bush administration as few other people short of the president had been able to do in the modern presidency. Colin Powel concluded that “things didn’t get really get decided until the president had met with Cheney alone.”

**Joseph Biden as Vice President**

When Obama chose Joe Biden as a running mate in August 2008, he knew he was adding depth and experience to the Democratic ticket. Biden came to the vice presidency after an impressive career in national politics. He had been a Senator since his election in 1972; he served on the Senate Foreign relations committee for decades, and was its chair in 2008. He ran for the Democratic nomination for president in 1988 and was an early candidate for the nomination in 2008. After becoming vice president, Biden rejected the Cheney model of the vice presidency; but saw himself as a valuable adviser to the president, an emissary to foreign nations, and liaison to his long-time friends in Congress.

Before taking office Biden visited Iraq and Afghanistan to talk with their leaders, and he continued to visit Iraq regularly during Obama’s first term and came to represent the United States during the drawdown of U.S. forces. He played a key role in negotiation the administration’s stimulus bill in Congress, and Obama put him in charge of overseeing its
implementation. In the debt ceiling crisis in the summer of 2011, Biden was the most active and
important representative of the president in dealing with both Democrats and Republicans on the
Hill.

Biden fit well into President Obama’s approach to decision making. Unlike President
Bush, Obama worked on mastering the details of the policy under consideration and took an
analytical approach. He ensured that there was an orderly process and careful deliberation with a
wide range of options considered. This is where Biden’s contributions were important. When
the vice president was willing to disagree with a seeming staff consensus, it legitimized the
option for others to voice their own skepticism without worrying about being excluded from
further deliberations.

In addition to his specific policy assignments and regular negotiations with members of
Congress, Biden’s most important role was to act as a high level counselor to the president on
major foreign policy decisions. In the fall of 2009 President Obama spent several months
reevaluating the US commitment of troops in Afghanistan. After taking office in 2009, at the
request of the military, he sent 21,000 more troops, bringing the total to 68,000. With US forces
not making major progress in the summer of 2009, General Stanley McChrystal sought more
troops to implement a counterinsurgency strategy in the conflict. McChrystal send a confidential
memo to Obama with options of increasing troop strength to 40, 20 or 12 thousand, and the
military made it clear that 40,000 was the minimum necessary. President Obama determined to
take the time to master the military details in order to make an informed decision. In a series of
ten formal meetings over two months in the fall of 2009, President Obama deliberated with his
civilian and military advisers. Though political opponents accused him of “dithering,” Obama
carefully worked through all of the available options.

The key issue was how solid the government of President Hamid Karzai was and how
effective the counterinsurgency strategy would be. Over the weeks of deliberation, the
president’s advisers engaged in a wide-ranging and thorough process of deliberation. Military
leaders, along with Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton, firmly advocated increasing the U.S.
troop presence significantly, by 40,000. President Obama, however, expressed skepticism about
the wisdom of sending that many additional troops.

During these deliberations, Vice President Biden played a key role in providing an
alternative option to the military proposals to increase the number of troops and widen the war.
Obama told Biden, “I want you to say exactly what you think. And I want you to ask the
toughest questions you can think of.” Obama was, in effect, assigning Biden the role of
“devil’s advocate” to question the wisdom of the consensus among military leaders. Biden
argued forcefully for a “counterterrorism” strategy that would focus on defeating al Qaeda rather
than on building a government in Afghanistan that Afghans would support. He argued for not
expanding the commitment of US troops but pulling back to defended bases. Rather than
attempting to defeat the Taliban throughout the country, Biden argued that US forces should be
used to strike any al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan or near the boarder in Pakistan. Although
several other civilian advisers favored Biden’s scaled back option, in the end President Obama
decided to go forward with an “surge” of 30,000 troops but with a drawdown beginning in the
fall of 2011.
Another major national security decision in which Biden played a key role was the decision of whether to send special forces to capture or kill Osama bin Laden. In the spring of 2011, circumstantial evidence was accumulated by the CIA that indicated that bin Laden was hiding in a large house in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Briefings on the possibility of bin Laden’s location were tightly held, and deliberations were secret. Even though the circumstantial evidence was strong, there were no photographs or other hard evidence that bin Laden was actually there. The consequences of the decision were far reaching. Capturing or killing bin laden would be an important victory for the United States in the war on al Qaeda. But a failed attempt would be a disaster and probably cost the lives of many US troops. His advisers were all aware that in 1980 President Carter ordered a raid to try to free US hostages in Tehran, but in the staging for the attack two US helicopters collided, killing several personnel and aborting the attempt to free the hostages. Even a successful raid on a house with innocent inhabitants would be a terrible mess and an embarrassment. The US would also be risking the ire of the government of Pakistan, a key ally in U.S. counterterrorism and a country with deep ambivalence toward the United States.

In the National Security Council meeting on April 29, 2011 to advise the president on the final decision of whether to authorize the raid, Obama asked each of his advisers their judgment. Most of his advisers were ambivalent, reflecting the reality that the evidence was genuinely ambiguous. The exceptions were CIA Director Leon Panetta, who unequivocally favored the attack and Vice President Biden, who advised against an attack until the evidence of bin Laden’s presence was more firmly established. “Mr. President, my suggestion is, don’t go.” The raid was successful, bin Laden was killed, and it was a great victory for the US war with al Qaeda. A week after the attack, President Obama recalled “At the end of the day, this was still a 55-45 situation. Had he [bin Laden] not been there, then there would have been some significant consequences.”

The point in these examples of Biden’s role in the Obama presidency, is not that his advice was rejected, but that Biden was willing to explicitly disagree with a consensus and give his frank advice to the president. The soliciting of opposing points of view was central to President Obama’s style of decision making and in contrast to that of George W. Bush. Eventually, Obama’s policy on the war in Afghanistan came close to that of Biden’s. Biden’s views on financial reform and the bailout of the auto companies also were influential to Obama’s final policies.

In summary, Biden had a good working relationship with President Obama and was an across-the-board adviser. His policy assignments were selective but important. President Obama benefitted from Biden’s decades of experience in US foreign policy by making him a special emissary to many countries. His negotiating trips to Iraq were essential to the US disengagement with the war. He played important role in US relations with Russia and China. He negotiated with the Senate in the ratification of the START Treaty with Russia. He was a key negotiator in the economic recovery act and oversaw its implementation early in the administration. He was important in winning the lame-duck congressional tax compromise after the 2010 elections and in negotiations over the debt ceiling crisis in 2011. In the last hours of 2012, he was the key negotiator in arriving at a compromise to avoid the sharp increases in taxes and drastic spending
cuts, known as the “fiscal cliff.” Scholar of the Vice Presidency, Joel Goldstein, concluded that “Biden has been one of the most consequential vice presidents in U.S. history.”

Conclusion

Presidents George W. Bush and Barak Obama reinforce the major trends of the twentieth century in organizing their White Houses. The centralization of control that began in the 1970s was inevitable, given the growth in functions of the U.S. government and the fragmentation in the executive branch and Congress. The only future restraint on centralization will come from within; if centralization continues, the White House will suffer from overload, and delegation will become necessary. Managing the White House itself has become a major challenge, let alone trying to manage the whole executive branch. The chief of staff’s job has become necessary and more complex. White House czars may seem necessary for coordination, but czars themselves have to be managed. It has taken two centuries, but the office of Vice President is now come into its own as an important asset for presidents to use to their advantage. Future presidents will likely keep this in mind when they choose their running mates.

ENDNOTES

1 Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Public Administration, November 15, 2012. The author was present.
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