

Assessing the Bush Presidency

James P. Pfiffner

George Mason University

George W. Bush began his presidency with as little political capital as any President since Gerald R. Ford; his opponent, Al Gore, outpolled him by more than a half million votes in the November election. The lack of an obvious mandate did not deter the president from pursuing a conservative policy priorities in the first phase of his presidency. By the end of his first six months in office President Bush had won a major tax cut victory and had begun to take his administration in a conservative policy direction. At the end of the summer of 2002 his poll ratings had dropped to the low 50s, and the administration was looking forward to a fall of battles with Democrats in the Senate. The second phase of the administration began with the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, and the outpouring of public support for the President. With the war in Afghanistan going well and beginning to wind down, President Bush began the third phase of his presidency when he initiated his political campaign to convince the country that a regime change in Iraq was essential to the security of the United States.

This chapter will examine the three phases of the first two years of President Bush's presidency: the transition and initial agenda, the war on terrorism, and the campaign for war with Iraq.

I. Transition and Initial Agenda

President George W. Bush's transition into office was one of the shortest, but most efficiently run in recent times. Because of the growth of the size and scope of the national government, transitions since the 1970s have been elaborately planned and bureaucratized. There never seems to be enough time to fully prepare to take over the government. Yet because of the delay in the authoritative outcome of the 2000 election, the incoming Bush administration had five fewer weeks for officially preparing to take office, about half as much time as other administrations. Surprisingly, under the circumstances, they accomplished the major tasks of the transitions — designating a White House staff, naming a cabinet, and laying the groundwork for their initial policy agenda — with dispatch.

The key to President Bush's White House staff was Vice President Richard Cheney, who was chosen to be the running mate because of his experience, competence, and relationship with the head of the ticket. Cheney was to break the mold of vice presidential importance to an administration. He ran the transition and dominated most of the organizational and policy deliberations early in the administration. Administration officials took pains to emphasize that all final decisions were in fact made by President Bush and that Cheney's role was merely advisory.

As chief of staff, the president chose Andrew Card, an experienced Washington insider.

He had worked in the White House for Ronald Reagan and had been a deputy to John Sununu in the Bush (41) administration before being appointed Secretary of Transportation; he also ran the 2000 Republican National Convention for Bush. While Card was the key to managing the White House, the dominant person, short of the President, was clearly Vice President Cheney whose national experience far outmatched that of President Bush. Cheney put together an impressive staff of his own, including his own national security aides and a domestic policy staff. Because of Cheney=s prominence in the administration, White House officials were careful to emphasize his subordinate position to the president. According to Cheney=s counselor, Mary Matalin, **A**The vice president has no personal or political agenda other than advising President Bush@ (Schmidt 2001).

After Cheney and Card, the two key aides to Bush were his political strategist, Karl Rove, and his counselor, Karen Hughes. Hughes had been Bush=s closest aide while he was governor of Texas and throughout his campaign for the presidency. When he reached the White House, Bush said, **A**I want you in every meeting where major decisions are made@ (Allen 2001). She played important roles in creating a sense of order in the White House and crafting Bush=s public image. She was in charge of 42 staffers involved in communications or press issues. The president lost an important advisor when she left the administration in the summer of 2002, though she continued to advise the president from her home in Texas.

Karl Rove had been Bush=s top campaign strategist, and in the White House played the role of senior political advisor, directing the offices of political affairs and public liaison. While not as close to Bush as Hughes, Rove played the important roles of concentrating on political strategy and tending to Bush=s links to the conservative wing of the Republican Party. At the senior level was the Rove-led **A**Strategy Group@ (named for a humorous television skit on Bush diction) of the top domestic and national security aides. He was also in charge of the Office of Communications which had a two to three week time horizon and the Press Office with a 24-48 hour time horizon (Milbank 2001).

Bush=s national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, was a veteran aide to Brent Scowcroft in the Bush (41) administration and top national security advisor to candidate Bush during the 2000 presidential campaign where she earned his respect and trust. She was, at 46, the youngest person to be National Security Advisor as well as the first woman in the post. Rice=s initial move was to restructure the NSC and cut its staff by a third. Rice would focus on advising the president, but just as her mentor Scowcroft, she did not plan to dominate the national security policy making process. In the Bush Administration it would be difficult for *anyone* to dominate the policy process, with such formidable principals as Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State Colin Powell, each with their own sizable staffs, on the National Security Council.

The Bush cabinet selection committee consisted of only four people: the President-elect, Dick Cheney, transition director Clay Johnson, and Andrew Card. Great pains were taken to keep cabinet choices secret until immediately before their announcement (Allen and Milbank 2001).

Without echoing President Clinton's promise to appoint a cabinet that **A**looks like America,⁶ Bush recruited a cabinet equally diverse by contemporary standards. Bush appointed three women (Ann Veneman at Agriculture, Gale Norton at Interior, and Christine Whitman at EPA **B** designated as part of the cabinet), two African-Americans (Colin Powell at State and Roderick Paige at Education), one Arab-American (Spencer Abraham at Energy), one Hispanic (Mel Martinez at Housing and Urban Development), and one Asian-American (Norman Mineta at Transportation, also a Democrat who had been Secretary of Commerce in the Clinton Administration). Only 6 of the 15 were white males. The diversity of the cabinet reflected both the increasingly qualified pool of minorities in the United States and the signal that Bush wanted to send to draw minority voters from the Democratic to the Republican Party.

Despite Bush's care in recruiting an experienced and well-credentialed cabinet, he was not about to reverse the trend of the past four decades of power gravitating to the White House. All of the policy priorities of the early administration were dominated by White House staffers rather than led from the cabinet. The Administration began with monthly cabinet meetings and frequent contact between cabinet members and the White House staff, but that did not translate into policy clout.

During the presidential campaign of 2000 candidate Bush set a moderate tone by asserting that he was a **A**compassionate conservative⁷ and advocating educational proposals that often appealed to Democratic voters. He promised to **A**change the tone⁸ in Washington by taking a bi-partisan approach to governing, as he had in Texas. While arguing for more defense spending and a national missile defense, privatizing part of Social Security, and a large tax cut, the emphasis was not on the more conservative aspects of his policy agenda.

In his first weeks in office he followed up on his promise to change the tone in Washington by meeting with a large number of members of Congress, many of them Democrats. He even attended caucus meetings of the Democrats in the House and the Senate to show that he was willing to communicate with the opposition. In his initial policy agenda, however, he pursued a conservative agenda that pleased his Republican base in the House of Representatives and the electorate (Broder 2001; Borger 2001; Clymer 2001; Herbert 2001; Balz 2001). His first executive order reversed U.S. policy and shut off U.S. funds to international family planning programs that allowed abortions. He also suspended, and later cancelled, Department of Labor ergonomic regulations designed to reduce harm from repetitive motion injuries.

In January 2001 Republicans controlled both houses of Congress and the Presidency for the first time since the beginning of the Eisenhower Administration, but their control of Congress was tenuous. The Senate was split 50-50, and Republicans control depended on the tie-breaking vote of the Vice President. The partisan split in the House in the first session of the 107th Congress was 222 to 211 (with two independents) and the defection of a handful of Republican votes could defeat Republican measures.

President Bush's first and largest legislative initiative was to propose a large tax cut, as

he had promised in the campaign. The administration's proposal was for a \$1.6 trillion cut over ten years that included reducing the top brackets, eliminating the estate tax, reducing the marriage penalty, and increasing child credits. Democrats argued that most of the benefits would go to the relatively well off and that the overall size of the reduction in revenues would threaten the projected surpluses; they favored a smaller cut that was targeted at lower income levels. The House passed Bush's plan, but the Senate held out for a smaller cut. After negotiations, the Senate went along with the House to vote for a \$1.35 trillion cut, an important policy victory for the President.

In another of Bush's top priorities he established by executive action a White House Office of Faith Based Initiatives to facilitate the use of federal funds for social purposes to be administered by faith based organizations. He proposed privatizing part of the Social Security system by setting aside a portion of contributions to the system for private investment in personal retirement accounts. Although much of his education agenda was endorsed by Democrats, Bush favored the creation of vouchers allowing public funds to be used by parents to send their children to private schools. A version of his education plan, without vouchers, was passed by Congress in the late fall of 2001.

In the late spring of 2001 the President had won an important victory in his large tax cut and was turning to his other priorities when his political power was dealt a blow. Senator James Jeffords, a third-term Republican from Vermont, had been a moderate, but loyal Republican. But he had felt increasingly out of place in the conservative Republican Party of the 1990s. He felt particularly strongly about special education policy, and felt that his priorities were being ignored by Republican conservatives in Congress. He decided that he no longer felt welcome in the Republican Party and, after voting for the Bush tax cut, switched his affiliation to Independent and caucused with the Democrats in the Senate. He said that the Republican Party was moving away from the traditional values of the Party of Lincoln—specifically, moderation, tolerance, fiscal responsibility (New York Times 2001).

Thus in the middle of the first session of the 107th Congress party control of the Senate shifted from the Republicans to the Democrats. With the 50-50 split after the election, the Republicans could count on a tie breaking vote from the Vice President. But with the Democrats controlling 51 votes to the Republicans= 49, Control of the Senate agenda, along with chairmanships of all the committees, went to the Democrats who would not be as sympathetic to President Bush's priorities.

At 180 days in office President Bush enjoyed public approval of 57 percent, not bad, but lower than the post war presidents except for Bill Clinton at 45 percent (USA Today 2001). In late summer President Bush won two victories in the House—on his comprehensive energy plan and on a patient's bill of rights. But victories in the Senate were going to be much more difficult, with the new Democratic majority.

Thus in the summer of 2001 the Bush Administration began to recalibrate its policy priorities to adjust to Democratic control in the Senate and looked forward to some difficult

policy battles in the fall. Then came the terrorist attacks that transformed the Bush Presidency and the nation=s priorities.

II. The Bush Presidency Transformed

At 8:48 am on September 11, 2001 American Airlines flight No. 11 crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center; at 9:03am United Airline flight 175 slammed into the south tower; at 9:45am American Airlines flight No. 77 hit the Pentagon; by 10:30am both towers had collapsed and the west section of the Pentagon was in flames. More than 3,000 people died in the attacks, almost all were Americans, including several hundred citizens of more than 50 other nations. Thus were world history, international relations, American politics, and the Bush Presidency transformed within minutes. A surge of public unity gave President Bush unprecedented public support; a compliant Congress voted support for his Administration=s war on terrorism; and early successes in the war in Afghanistan bolstered the President=s popularity.

The first and most important political effect of the terrorist bombings of September 11 was a huge jump in public approval of President Bush. In the September 7-10 Gallup poll public approval of the President stood at 51 percent; the next poll, on September 14-15 registered 86 percent approval B a 35 percent jump virtually overnight (Gallup 2001). It is common for presidents to enjoy increased public approval whenever there is a crisis involving U.S. national security, called by political scientists a Rally event.@ But the magnitude of sudden change in public opinion was unprecedented; for instance, the Vietnam peace agreement in 1973 caused a 16 point jump, and the Truman Doctrine and the Cuban Missile crisis each cause a 12 point jump (Brody 1991, 57; Mueller 1973; Brace and Hinckley 1992). Interestingly, the increased public approval for the President was accompanied by jumps in approval for the federal government in general and Congress. For the remainder of 2001 public approval of President Bush averaged 87 percent; whereas, his approval for the first several months of his presidency averaged 56 percent.

The sustained historically high public approval ratings of President Bush reflected public confidence in the way he and Congress handled the U.S. reaction to the terrorist bombings. In an address to a joint session of Congress on September 20 President Bush declared, ATonight we are a country awakened to a danger and called to defend freedom....Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done(White House transcript 2001)@ Congress responded quickly with virtual unanimous support for measures designed to support what the President called a war on terrorism. Congress quickly passed a bill providing \$40 billion in emergency appropriations for military action, beefing up domestic security, and rebuilding New York City.

The Administration also asked for and got sweeping authority to pursue an international war on terrorism. On September 14 Congress passed a joint resolution giving President Bush broad discretion in his direction of the military response to the terrorist attacks. Section 2 (a) of the resolution provided:

That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against

those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.

The grant of power was sweeping in that it allowed the President to decide as he determines which nations, organizations, or persons United States forces may attack.

On September 12, the day after the attacks, the CIA and military leaders briefed the President on plans that had been underway to deal with al Qaeda and current military options. President Bush then made the key initial decisions of the war after meeting with his war council on September 15 at Camp David who presented a range of options for pursuing the war. The key elements of his decision were that the initial military actions would be limited to Afghanistan and that the war would begin with a massive air campaign before ground forces were introduced in large numbers (Carney and Dickerson 2001). On October 7 airstrikes began on Taliban forces in Kabul, Kandahar, and Jalalabad. U.S ground forces, cooperating with the Northern Alliance began attacking Taliban forces, with the tide turning in favor of the U.S. in mid November, with Kabul falling to the Northern Alliance on November 13. In early December allied forces took control of Kandahar, and a coalition of Afghan forces took official control of the country by the end of the year.

Congress also passed anti-terrorism measures proposed by Attorney General John Ashcroft with broad, bi-partisan support. The legislation which was passed by Congress in mid-October and signed by the President later in the month, was entitled the **Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001**, or more briefly the **U.S.A. Patriot Act**. The bill broadened the definition of who might be considered a terrorist and gave the Attorney General expanded powers to deal with suspected terrorists. If the Attorney General had reasonable grounds to believe that certain foreigners might be terrorists, the Justice Department could detain them indefinitely. Congress also passed provisions expanding government powers on wire tapping, computer surveillance, and money laundering. Attorney General Ashcroft also issued an order allowing officials to listen in on attorney-client communications for suspects who might be terrorists. Under the new legal powers government authorities had detained more than 1,000 people by November 2001. Many of these people were confined secretly for indefinite periods without being charged with crimes (Purdy 2001).

The Bush Administration was even more disciplined and loyal than before the attacks. There had been relatively little of the infighting, backbiting, and leaks in the Bush White House that were common to most other administrations, including his father's. In part, this was because White House staffers genuinely liked the President; but it was also a consequence of Bush's high premium on loyalty and the willingness of his top staffers to aggressively enforce discipline. Similarly, in the cabinet, there was usually not much room between what the President thought and his cabinet secretaries' public positions. One senior Bush aide put it this

way: AThis is not a presidency under which there=s a lot of freelancing within the cabinet. It=s a very tight team, very regimented, very tight message discipline, and I think the cabinet officers realize a large part of their job is to be shields (Purdum 2001; Berke 2001d).@

The shift of the presidency to a war footing also changed the agenda and importance of the cabinet and White House advisers. The turn around in the reputations of the Secretaries of State and Defense was most striking. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in the spring of 2001 was leading a reevaluation of U.S. national security forces and contemplating major changes in the role and size of the Army. But he was running into flak from top military leaders for his top-down approach and from Congress for insufficient consultation (Ricks 2001). There was even public speculation that he would leave the administration at the end of its first year in office. But once the war in Afghanistan began Rumsfeld became the clear leader of U.S. military forces and the preeminent spokesman for the military actions of the Administration.

In his first six months in office Secretary of State Colin Powell had lost a number of minor skirmishes within the administration over foreign policy (on relations with North Korea, U.S. commitments in the Balkans, the Kyoto global warming treaty, and abandoning the ABM Treaty) and was seen as being marginalized by his foes within the administration. Immediately after the terrorist attacks, Powell became the architect of the coalition of allies that joined the war effort by providing overflight rights, bases, troops, or public support. He soon came to be seen as the main spokesman for the President in foreign policy matters. Vice President Cheney continued to play a crucial role in the operations of the White House, though much of the time he was Aat an undisclosed location@ for security purposes.

III. The Political Campaign for War With Iraq

A. The Shift from the War on Terrorism to War with Iraq

After the attacks on the United States by al Qaeda, President Bush did an effective job in uniting the country, mobilizing the military for retaliation, and laying the groundwork for organizing the government to ensure homeland security. The initial stages of the U.S. military response in Afghanistan were effective, and the international community was successfully courted to secure its support for U.S. actions against terrorists.

The military mission in Afghanistan, however, did Acreep@ in its scope. It began as an attempt to capture or kill the planners of the terrorist attacks on the United States, particularly Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization of terrorists. But the U.S. military mission soon grew to the military defeat of the Taliban regime that controlled Afghanistan, and with the help of local war lords of the Northern Alliance, the mission was successful in defeating them militarily and driving much of the Taliban regime into the mountains or out of the country.

But with the defeat of the Taliban came the need to create a national government for Afghanistan, and the resulting coalition of Afghan forces met with some success, with the United States providing aid and military training while its own forces continued to operate in the

country in search of al Qaeda remnants. But the new government was not immediately successful in uniting the country, and it was subject to armed attack from rival internal forces. U.S. forces faced difficulties in their search for terrorists and killed a number of Afghan civilians because of poor intelligence (Filkins 2002).

In the summer of 2002 the U.S. was faced with winding down its military mission in Afghanistan and providing for the permanence of its new government. Thus a mission creep in Afghanistan was the reality that faced President Bush who had previously derided nation building as a goal of U.S. foreign policy. But there was a logic and necessity to the expansion of the expansion of the U.S. responsibilities in its war against the terrorists, al Qaeda, and the Taliban. Each became a logical outcome of the other and U.S. security could not be protected without the progression.

But before the War in Afghanistan was finished, President Bush decided to undertake a campaign to convince Americans that major threats to U.S. security existed in the world and that a regime change in Iraq was essential to U.S. security. His first major public shift in focus came in his State of the Union address in January 2002 when he denounced an Axis of Evil that comprised North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. U.S. foreign and military policy were to be focused on the mitigation of danger to the U.S. from these rogue states. While the hostile reaction of these states to Bush's rhetorical attack was predictable, the U.S. took no immediate action with respect to North Korea and Iran.

In contrast to the lack of major initiatives to follow up on the verbal attacks on North Korea and Iran, the spring and summer of 2002 saw the Bush administration prepare for a major war with Iraq in order to effect a regime change by deposing Saddam Hussein from power. In a speech at West Point in June 2002 President Bush declared that the growing threat to the United States from terrorism and rogue states made it necessary to consider preemptive military strikes in defense of the United States against these threats. The United States must be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty, Bush declared. The war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt its plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. . . . The only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act (Kaiser 2002). Though Bush did not directly say that his remarks were directed at Saddam Hussein and Iraq, that was the subtext that everyone understood.

B. Arguments for and against War with Iraq

Few in the United States questioned that Saddam Hussein was a tyrant who deserved to be overthrown. The international case against Saddam was strong. He fought a long, bloody war with Iran; he invaded Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia in 1991; he brutally suppressed his own people and used poison gas against the Kurds in northern Iraq; he fired scud missiles into Israel during the Gulf War; he stockpiled and developed chemical and biological weapons

and attempted to develop nuclear weapons; and he was an implacable enemy of the United States which defeated him in the Gulf War in 1991 (Pfiffner 1993). He consistently refused to comply with the provisions for UN inspection of his weapons facilities that he agreed to at the end of the Gulf War.

President Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, summarized the administration's case for war in August 2002: This is an evil man who, left to his own devices, will wreak havoc again on his own population, his neighbors and, if he gets weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, on all of us. There is a very powerful moral case for regime change. We certainly do not have the luxury of doing nothing (Kessler 2002). Vice President Cheney also argued for a U.S. attack on Iraq in a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars on August 26, 2002:

Deliverable weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terror network or a murderous dictator, or the two working together, constitutes as grave a threat as can be imagined. . . . The risks of inaction are far greater than the risk of action. . . . Armed with an arsenal of these weapons of terror and a seat atop 10 percent of the world's oil reserves, Saddam Hussein could then be expected to seek domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of the world's energy supplies, directly threaten America's friends throughout the region, and subject the United States or any other nation to nuclear blackmail (Milbank 2002).

The administration was also convinced that there was a connection between the terrorists and the Iraq government in the form of a meeting in April 2001 in the Czech Republic between Mohamed Atta, the leader of the terrorist attack in the U.S., and an Iraqi diplomat. The argument that there was not a tight link between Saddam and the war on terrorism was made by Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to Presidents Ford and Bush (41), and a close friend to the retired President Bush; Scowcroft wrote an op-ed piece in August 2002 arguing against a U.S. attack on Iraq: A. . . there is scant evidence to tie Saddam to terrorist organizations, and even less to the Sept. 11 attacks. Indeed Saddam's goals have little in common with the terrorists who threaten us, and there is little incentive for him to make common cause with them@ (Scowcroft 2002).

Thus the moral case that Saddam was a tyrant who ought to be overthrown was a strong one that was accepted by many countries in Europe and some in the Middle East. But the moral case against Saddam was not universally accepted as sufficient justification for initiating a U.S. war against Iraq.

The arguments for a preemptive attack by the U.S. on Iraq were compelling to the administration and its supporters. But critics of a U.S. preemptive war made a number of points against a U.S. attack. As Henry Kissinger (who supported the Administration's argument for regime change) pointed out, a preemptive U.S. attack would undermine conventions of international law centuries old. The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 established the principle@ that nations are not justified in interfering in the internal affairs of other nations. Contemporary

international law justifies war in response to attack, but does not provide for preemptive wars in many circumstances (Kissinger 2002).

This argument was also made, surprisingly, by Representative Dick Armey, Republican majority leader of the House of Representatives, in early August of 2002. **I** don't believe that America will justifiably make an unprovoked attack on another nation. It would not be consistent with what we have been as a nation or what we should be as a nation@ (Schmitt 2002).

Besides the argument that there was not a sufficient *causssus belli* to justify war, the main objections to war were prudential. That is, even though Saddam's regime deserved to be toppled, it would be unwise for the U.S. to do it through force. After talk of war with Iraq became serious in the White House, leaks began to flow out of the Pentagon that some in the military did not think that a war would be as easily winnable as some in the White House thought. One line of thinking held that the United States should not undertake another war while troops were still in Afghanistan dealing with the remnants of al Qaeda and trying to support the new Afghan government (the one-war-at-a-time objection). Another argument was that the war on terrorism should be our first priority. In Brent Scowcroft's judgment, **A**Our pre-eminent security priority **B** underscored repeatedly by the president **B** is the war on terrorism. An attack on Iraq at this time would seriously jeopardize, if not destroy, the global counterterrorist campaign we have undertaken@ (Scowcroft 2002).

Proponents of war with Iraq argued that terrorists are stateless people, and are willing to die for their cause and thus undeterrable. The impossibility-of-deterrence argument for war with Iraq was based on the premise that Saddam would likely attack the United States as soon as he had the means to do it, and he would probably share his weapons with Al Qaeda. According to Henry Kissinger, **A**But the terrorist threat transcends the nation-state. . . .This is why policies that deterred the Soviet Union for 50 years are unlikely to work against Iraq's capacity to cooperate with terrorist groups. . . .And the terrorists have no national base to protect@ (Kissinger 2002).

But skeptics of arguments for a war with Iraq pointed out that Saddam was a tyrant who gained great benefits from his control of Iraq, and that fear of losing his power, his country, and even his life were sufficient deterrents to keep him in check for reasons that terrorists did not share. These reasons should deter him from any obvious aid to terrorists who might attack the United States. In the words of journalist Thomas L. Friedman, Saddam could be deterred ***A**because he loves life more than he hates us.@* Terrorists are undeterrables because they ***A**hate us more than they love their own lives,* and therefore cannot be deterred@ (italics in original, Friedman 2002). During the Gulf War Saddam had chemical and biological weapons mounted on Scud missiles, but he did not use them against U.S. bases or Israel for fear of massive retaliation (Allison 2002).

Some proponents of war argued that in addition to removing Saddam from power, a U.S. invasion of Iraq could establish a democratic regime that might transform the Arab states of the Middle East. Paul D. Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense, who had advocated a U.S. attack on Iraq since the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the U.S., said: **I** don't think

it=s unreasonable to think that Iraq, properly managed **B** and it=s going to take a lot of attention, and the stakes are enormous, much higher than Afghanistan **B** that it really could turn out to be, I hesitate to say it, the first Arab democracy, or at least the first one except for Lebanon=s brief history@ (Keller 2002). Advocates of regime change in Iraq, Robert Kagan and William Kristol, argued: **A**A devastating knockout blow against Saddam Hussein, followed by an American-sponsored effort to rebuild Iraq and put it on a path toward democratic governance, would have a seismic impact on the Arab world **B** for the better. The Arab world may take a long time coming to terms with the West, but that process will be hastened by the defeat of the leading anti-western Arab tyrant@ (Daadler and Lindsay 2002).

While no one doubted the ability of the U.S. to prevail in a war with Iraq, critics of the Administration=s war plans were dubious about the ease with which the war might proceed. If Saddam learned any tactical lessons from the Gulf War and the War in Afghanistan, he might very well refuse to mass his troops in the open and instead withdraw them to urban centers, particularly Baghdad, and engage U.S. troops in urban guerilla warfare. This possibility would put U.S. troops at a disadvantage and take away much of U.S. technological superiority. With Saddam=s military assets located close to civilian housing, U.S. precision bombing would still not be able to avoid civilian casualties (O=Hanlon and Gordon 2002).

Even if a U.S. invasion were successful in toppling Saddam, it was not clear that any alternative acceptable government would emerge, and U.S. forces might have to stay in Iraq to stabilize the country and eventually be perceived as an occupying force that would antagonize Arabs in and out of Iraq. James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State in the Bush (41) Administration warned, **A**If we are to change the regime in Iraq, we will have to occupy the country militarily. The costs of doing so, politically, economically and in terms of casualties, could be great. . . . It cannot be done on the cheap. It will require substantial forces and substantial time to put those forces in place to move. . . . We will face the problem of how long to occupy and administer a big, fractious country and what type of government or administration should follow@ (Baker 2002).

In addition to the reservations of active duty professional military in the Pentagon, others with combat experience expressed reservations about war with Iraq. Republican Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska, a decorated Vietnam war veteran, said: **A**Many of those who want to rush this country into war and think it would be so quick and easy don=t know anything about war. They come at it from an intellectual perspective versus having sat in jungles or foxholes and watched their friends get their heads blown off. I try to speak for those ghosts of the past a little bit@ (Associated Press 2002). Retired General Anthony Zinni, senior advisor to Secretary of State Powell and former chief of the U.S. Central Command (which includes the Middle East), said: **A**We need to quit making enemies that we don=t need to make enemies out of. . . . It=s pretty interesting that all the generals see it the same way and all the others who have never fired a shot and are not to go to war see it another way@ (Washington Post 2002).

James Webb, Vietnam veteran and assistant secretary of defense and secretary of the Navy in the Regan Administration argued that war with Iraq was ill-considered.

Meanwhile, American military leaders have been trying to bring a wider focus to the band of neoconservatives that began beating the war drums on Iraq before the dust had even settled on the World Trade Center. Despite the efforts of the necons to shut them up or dismiss them as unqualified to deal in policy issues, these leaders, both active-duty and retired, have been nearly unanimous in their concerns. Is there an absolutely vital national interest that should lead us from containment to unilateral war and a long-term occupation of Iraq? . . . The issue before us is not simply whether the United States should end the regime of Saddam Hussein, but whether we as a nation are prepared to physically occupy territory in the Middle East for the next 30 to 50 years (Webb 2002).

Echoing another president from Texas, Lyndon Johnson, George Bush dismissed the concerns of the professional military: **A**There=s a lot of nervous nellies at the Pentagon@ (Weisman 2002).

C. Persuading Congress and the United Nations

In August 2002 the Bush administration argued that the 1991 resolution authorizing President Bush=s (41) decision to initiate the Gulf War extended to his son=s initiating war with Iraq in 2002 or 2003. Although the president said that he would consult with members of Congress before going to war, he did not admit that he needed the approval of Congress or a declaration of war. A senior administration official said, **A**We don=t want to be in the legal position of asking Congress to authorize the use of force when the president already has that full authority. We don=t want, in getting a resolution, to have conceded that one was constitutional necessary@ (Allen and Eilperin 2002). White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales and deputy, Timothy E. Flanigan were in charge of the administration=s legal case.

The Administration had planned to begin an intensive political campaign in September to convince Congress and the country that war with Iraq was necessary. Plans had been made in the summer of 2002, long before the president=s vacation at his home in Texas in August. Rather than directly meeting objections to the war plans in the summer as leaks from the Pentagon and op-ed pieces raised cautionary concerns, the Administration preferred to wait until September to take its case to the American People. **A**From a marketing point of view you don=t introduce new products in August,@ explained chief of staff Andrew Card (Bumiller 2002c). Despite White House plans to wait until September, the rising frequency of voices critical of Bush war plans (some from members of his father=s administration) prompted Vice President Cheney to deliver a strong speech defending the administration=s plans on August 26 to a Veterans of Foreign Wars convention in Nashville. **A**This nation will not live at the mercy of terrorists or terror regimes,@ declared Cheney (Kessler and Slevin 2002).

In September, President Bush changed the administration=s argument and said that he would seek congressional approval of a resolution to support his taking the nation into war and that he would take his case to the United Nations. Briefing congressional leaders at White House on September 4, Bush said: **A**I also made it very clear that we look forward to an open dialogue with Congress...@ (Bumiller 2002a)

The administration's arguments for the necessity for war to achieve regime change in Iraq were made in several forums over the next month. They included a presidential address to the nation on the anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks, a speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations the next day, the release of a new national security doctrine, and a presidential address to the nation.

In his speech to the United Nations on September 12, the president framed the issue as one of credibility for the UN and the need for its many resolutions to be enforced. Citing **A**Flagrant violations^o by Saddam Hussein of UN resolutions, Bush declared that **A**we have been more than patient. . . .The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations and a threat to peace.^o Arguing that the UN cannot afford to be **A**irrelevant,^o he urged the passage of a tough resolution that would threaten Saddam with military action if he did not give up his weapons of mass destruction. **A**We cannot stand by and do nothing while dangers gather. We must stand up for our security and for the permanent rights and the hopes of mankind^o (Bush 2002a).

Shortly after Bush's UN speech, the administration released a new national security doctrine for the United States that justified preemptive military strikes by the United States (Bush 2002b). The long document began with statement that **A**The United States possesses unprecedented **B** and unequaled **B** strength and influence in the world.^o (Bush Part I, p. 3) It asserted that the United States **A**will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right to self defense by acting preemptively against...rogue states and terrorists.^o (Bush Part VIII, p. 23, Bush Part V., p. 9) Since traditional deterrence does not work against stateless terrorists, **A**the overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD [weapons of mass destruction] compels us to action.^o It concluded that the danger of inaction while enemies build their forces was greater than the danger of attacking enemies preemptively (Bush Part V, P. 11).

In anticipation of the congressional vote on a resolution authorizing war with Iraq, the President made a speech to the nation from Cincinnati on 7 October 2002 in which he explained the need for the authorization to take military action.

ASome citizens wonder, >After 11 years of living with this problem, why do we need to confront it now?=^o And there's a reason. We have experienced the horror of September the 11th. We have seen that those who hate American are willing to crash airplanes into buildings full of innocent people. Our enemies would be no less willing, in fact they would be eager, to use biological or chemical or a nuclear weapon. Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud (Bush 2002c).

The president made the case that America was vulnerable to terrorist attack and that a hostile regime in Iraq might be willing to share its CBN [chemical, biological, nuclear] technology with terrorists. Thus the United States had to act preemptively to prevent this from happening.

But not everyone agreed that the threat from Saddam was as immediate as the president argued. In a letter from to Senator Bob Graham (D-Fl), chair of Intelligence Committee, CIA Director George J. Tenet said that, in the judgement of the CIA, the probability of Saddam initiating an attack on the United States in the foreseeable future, given the conditions we understand now, the likelihood I think would be low. But if faced with a use or lose situation, Saddam would likely use his weapons. Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or C.B.W. [chemical and biological weapons] against the United States. . . . Should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no longer be deterred, he probably would become much less constrained in adopting terrorist actions (CIA 2002).

Critics of the administration's war plans argued that a U.S. attack would likely precipitate the use of the chemical and biological weapons that the U.S. feared. They also felt that the negative consequences of a U.S. invasion of Iraq would outweigh the benefits of stopping Saddam's efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. But President Bush's arguments were sufficient to persuade a majority of Congress to vote for an authorizing resolution.

The final resolution, which was passed by the House on October 10 and by the Senate on October 11, was very similar to the draft resolution proposed by the White House. After detailing Iraq's refusal to comply with UN resolutions on weapons inspections and noting that members of Al Qaeda were in Iraq, the resolution stated: The president is authorized to use the armed forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate, in order to: (1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq. It also required the president to notify the speaker of the House and the president pro tempore of the Senate no later than 48 hours after exercising his authority and present the reasons for his actions (U.S. Congress 2002).

While there was a debate in Congress and statements by those supporting and opposing the resolution, there was never much doubt about the outcome, and the debate lacked the drama of the deliberation in 1991 over the Gulf War Resolution. A number of Democrats voted for the resolution from fear that a negative vote could be used against them in the upcoming elections. The Democratic leadership, Majority Leader of the Senate Tom Daschele and House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt voted for the measure. The resolution passed in the house by 296 to 133, with 6 Republicans and 126 Democrats (and one independent) voting against it. In the Senate the resolution passed 77 to 23, with 21 Democrats, one Republican, and one Independent voting against it. The president had managed to persuade former critics of war with Iraq, Senators Hagel, Lugar, and Kerry and Representative Richard Army to vote for the resolution.

As the administration was convincing Congress to give the president authority to attack Iraq, U.S. diplomats were hard at work building a coalition to convince the UN Security Council to pass a new resolution on Iraq. While in the summer the administration had not intended to go to the U.N., sustained arguments from Secretary of State Powell and Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair convinced the president that the U.S. would be in a stronger position if it had

international support. Intense negotiations took place throughout the month of October and early November 2002 to bring around the members of the UN Security Council. The United States backed off its insistence that a new resolution was not needed and agreed to French insistence that if Saddam did not comply with the inspection regime, that the Security Council would meet again to consider options. At the last minute France, Russia, China, and Syria went along with the rest of the Council on a strongly worded Resolution. Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one week to promise to comply with it and until February 21, 2003 at the latest for the UN inspectors to report back on Iraq's compliance.

While the U.S. did not get everything that it sought in the Resolution, it was a major victory for the administration. Saddam was on notice that he had to comply with UN orders to get rid of his weapons of mass destruction, and if he did not, there would be widespread international support for U.S. military action against Iraq.

The congressional elections of 2002 were unusual in that for only the second time since 1934 the President's party picked up seats in the House, strengthening the Republicans' control of that chamber. But more importantly, the Republicans regained control of the Senate that they had lost when Vermont Senator James Jeffords defected from Republican ranks and became an independent in May of 2001. He voted with the Democrats, giving them control of the Senate leadership and committees until the 2002 elections.

The election was an important victory for the Republicans because it gave them control of both houses of Congress along with the presidency. But in addition, the election was perceived to be a personal victory for President Bush who had set a record of presidential involvement in congressional midterm elections (he traveled 10,000 miles in the last five days), and who was given credit for making the difference in several key races (Bumiller and Sanger 2002).

President Bush said, "If there is a mandate in any election — at least in this one — it's that people want something to get done. . . . I think the way to look at this election is to say that people want something done" (Milbank, 2002). Republicans looked forward to pursuing their domestic and national security agenda in the 108th Congress.

Conclusion

In sum, the first two years of George W. Bush's term were extraordinary. He quickly overcame the deficit of having won 500,000 fewer votes than Al Gore in the 2000 election and set out on a concerted conservative agenda. Though not successful across the board with all of his policy priorities, he was able to push his most important initiative — a \$1.35 trillion tax cut over ten years — through the closely split, Republican controlled Congress. He won approval of a large new federal role in education, with federal funding linked to performance on tests.

After the terrorists attacks on New York and Washington, he reassured the nation and won significant new power to pursue terrorists suspects within the United States. Despite not

capturing Osama bin Laden, he led an effective war effort in Afghanistan that overthrew the Taliban regime, scattered Al Qaeda, and undermined its infrastructure. In the summer and fall of 2002 he used the powers of the presidency to convince the Congress, despite the serious reservations of much of the foreign policy establishment and the professional military, to grant him sweeping authority to take the nation to war at his own discretion. In a historic departure from U.S. tradition, he revised U.S. national security doctrine to allow for wars of preemption. Despite nearly universal international condemnation of his war aims with Iraq, Bush was able to use the military, economic, and diplomatic power of the United States to win unanimous UN Security Council approval of a resolution that threatened Saddam Hussein with military action if he did not comply with it. After Republicans won back the Senate in the 2002 elections, he won approval of legislation creating a Department of Homeland Security.

All in all, his successful pursuit of his major priorities was nothing short of remarkable. Judging whether all of his priorities were wise would have to await historical developments.

REFERENCES

- Allen, Mike. 2001. **A**Hughes Keeps White House in Line.@ *The Washington Post*, 3/19/01, p. 1, A6.
- Allen, Mike. 2001. **A**Airport Bill Approach Could Be Repeated.@ *The Washington Post*, 11/19/01, p. A2.
- Allen, Mike, and Juliet Eilperin. 2002. **A**Bush Aides Say Iraq War Needs No Hill Vote.@ *The Washington Post*, 8/26/02, p. 1, A12.
- Allen, Mike, and Dana Milbank. 2001. **A**Cabinet Chosen Quietly, Quickly.@ *The Washington Post*, 1/7/01, p. 1, A6.
- Allen, Mike, and Eric Pianin. 2001. **A**Ridge Carries Message on Anthrax.@ *The Washington Post*, 10/25/01, p. A4.
- Allison, Graham T. 2002. **A**The View From Baghdad.@ *The Washington Post*, 7/31/02, p. A19.
- Associated Press. 2002. *New York Times*, 8/26/02, p. 1.
- Baker, III, James A. 2002. **A**The Right Way to Change a Regime.@ *The New York Times*, 8/25/02, p. wk9.
- Balz, Dan. 2001. **A**Bush Protects His Right Flank.@ *The Washington Post*, 2/12/01, p. 1, A13.
- Barnes, James A. 2001. **A**Is Bush Poisoning His Well.@ *National Journal*, p. 1120.
- Berke, Richard L. 2001a. In the White House, a Sense Of What History Can Teach. *The New York Times*, 1/9/01, p. 1, A18.
- Berke, Richard L. 2001b. **A**Bush Shapes His Presidency With Sharp Eye on Father's.@ *The New York Times*, 3/28/01, p. 1, A13.
- Berke, Richard L. 2001c. **A**Jokes Remain, But Many Say Bush Is Showing Signs of War's Burden.@ *The New York Times*, 12/9/01, p. B7.
- Berke, Richard L. 2001d. **A**This Time, Dissent Stops At the White House Door.@ *The New York Times*, 12/16/01, p. wk3.
- Borger, Gloria. 2001. **A**Pleased as Punch.@ *U.S. News & World Report*, 4/9/01, p. 35.
- Broder, David. 2001. **A**No Moderate in GOP Clothing.@ *The Washington Post*, 4/18/01, p. A21.

- Brody, Richard A. 1991. *Assessing the President*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bumiller, Elisabeth. 2001a. **A**For a President at War, Refuge at Camp David.@ *The New York Times*, 11/5/01, p. 1, B6.
- Bumiller, Elisabeth. 2002b. **A**Bush Aides Set Strategy to Sell Policy on Iraq.@ *The New York Times*, 9/7/02, p. 1.
- Bumiller, Elisabeth. 2002. **A**President to Seek Congress's Assent Over Iraq Action.@ *The New York Times*, 9/5/02, p. 1, A10.
- Bumiller, Elisabeth, and David E. Sanger. 2002. **A**Taking Command in Crisis, Bush Wields New Powers.@ *The New York Times*, 1/1/02, p. 1, A10.
- Burke, John P. 2000. *Presidential Transitions*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Bush, George W. 2002a. *The Washington Post*, 9/13/02, p. A31.
- Bush, George W. 2002c. *The Washington Post*, 10/8/02, p. A20.
- Bush, George W. 2002b. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* The White House, [Available from whitehouse.gov/nsc/print/nssall.html].
- Carney, James, and John F. Dickerson. 2001. **A**Inside the War Room.@ *Time*, 12/31/01.
- Carney, James, and John F. Dickerson. 2002. **A**Inside the War Room.@ *Time*, 1/7/02.
- Central Intelligence Agency. 2002. Letter Reprinted. *The New York Times*, 10/9/02, p. A12.
- Clymer, Adam. 2001. **A**Not So Fast@. *The New York Times*, 4/1/01, p. E1.
- Congress, U.S. 2002. Resolution. *The New York Times*, 10/12/02, p. A12.
- Daadler, Ivo H., and James M. Lindsay. 2002. **A**It's Hawk vs. Hawk in the Bush Administration.@ *The Washington Post*, 10/27/02, p. B3.
- Dahl, Robert. 1990. **A**The Myth of Presidential Mandate.@ *Political Science Quarterly* Fall.
- Filkins, Dexter. 2002. **A**Flaws in U.S. Air War Left Hundreds of Civilians Dead.@ *The New York Times*, 7/21/02, p. 1.
- Fineman, Howard. 2001-2002. **A**Bush's Next Challenge: Dodging No. 41's Fate.@ *Newsweek*, 12/31/01-1/7/02.
- Friedman, Thomas L. 2002. **A**Iraq, Upside Down.@ *The New York Times*, 9/18/02, p. A31.
- Gallup Organization. 2001. *Poll Trend, Presidential Ratings - Job Approval* website, 12/12/01. Available from www.gallup.com.
- Goldstein, Amy, and Eric Pianin. 2001. *The Washington Post*, p. 1, A6.
- Greenstein, Fred I. **A**The Presidential Leadership of George Bush: A Pre- and Post-9/11 Comparison.@
- Harris, John, and Dan Balz. 2001. **A**A Question of Capital.@ *The Washington Post*, 4/29/01, p.1, A6.
- Herbert, Bob. 2001. **A**The Mask Comes Off.@ *The New York Times*, 3/26/01, p. A23.
- Hinckley, Paul Brace, and Barbara Hinckley. 1992. *Follow the Leader: Opinion Polls and the Modern Presidency*. New York: Basic Books.
- Hoagland, Jim. 2001. **A**The Danger of Bush's Unilateralism.@ *The Washington Post*, 7/29/01, p. B7.
- Jones, Charles O. 1994. *The Presidency in a Separated System*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings.
- Kahn, Joseph. 2001. **A**House Supports Trade Authority Sought by Bush.@ *The New York Times*, 12/7/01, p. 1, A22.
- Kaiser, Robert G. 2002. **A**The Long and Short of It.@ *The Washington Post*, 9/8/02, p. B1, B2.
- Keller, Bill. 2001. **A**The World According to Powell.@ *The New York Times Magazine*, 11/25/01.

- Keller, Bill. 2002. **A**The Sunshine Warrior.@ *The New York Times Magazine*, 9/22/02, pp. 48-55.
- Kessler, Glenn. 2002. **A**Rice Lays Out Case for War In Iraq.@ *The Washington Post*, 8/16/02, p. 1, A20.
- Kessler, Glenn, and Peter Slevin. 2002. **A**Cheney Is Fulcrum of Foreign Policy.@ *The Washington Post*, 10/13/02, p. 1, A16.
- Kissinger, Henry A. 2002. **A**Our Intervention in Iraq.@ *The Washington Post*, 8/12/02, p. A15.
- Lewis, Anthony. 2001. **A**Mr. Bush's New World Order.@ *The New York Times*, 10/13/01, p. A23.
- Lewis, Neil A. 2001. **A**Ashcroft Defends Antiterror Plan; Says Criticism May Aid U.S. Foes.@ *The New York Times*, 12/7/01, p. 1, B6.
- Milbank, Dana. 2001. **A**Serious 'Strategy'.@ *The Washington Post*, 4/27/01, p. 1, A5.
- Milbank, Dana. 2002. **A**Cheney Says Iraqi Strike Is Justified.@ *The Washington Post*, 8/27/02, p. 1, A8.
- Morin, Richard, and Claudia Deane. 2001. **A**Most Americans Back U.S. Tactics.@ *The Washington Post*, 11/29/01, p. 1, A12.
- Mueller, John. 1973. *War, Presidents and Public Opinion*. New York: John Wiley.
- Nakashima, Ellen, and Dana Milbank. 2001. **A**Bush Cabinet Takes Back Seat in Driving Policy.@ *The Washington Post*, p. 1, A12.
- O'Hanlon, Michael E., and Philip H. Gordon. 2002. **A**Is Fighting Iraq Worth the Risks?@ *The New York Times*, 7/25/02, p. A19.
- Pfiffner, James P. 2000. *The Modern Presidency*. Bedford, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- Pfiffner, James P. 2002a. **A**The President and Congress at the Turn of the Century: Structural Sources of Conflict.@ In *Rivals for Power: Presidential-Congressional Relations*, edited by J. A. Thurber. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Pfiffner, James P. 2002b. **A**The Transformation of the Bush Presidency.@ In *Understanding the Presidency, 3rd Edition*, edited by J. P. Pfiffner and R. H. Davidson. New York: Longman.
- Pfiffner, James P. 1993. **A**Presidential Policy-Making and the Gulf War,@ in Marcia Lynn Whicker, James P. Pfiffner, and Raymond A. Moore, eds. *The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Pianin, Eric. 2001. **A**EPA Chief Lobbied on Warming before Bush's Emissions Switch.@ *The Washington Post*, 3/14/01, p. 1, A6.
- Purdum, Todd S. 2001. **A**Mr. Heat Shield Keeps Boss Happy.@ *The New York Times*, 12/6/01, p. B7.
- Purdy, Matthew. 2001. **A**Bush's New Rules to Fight Terror Transform the Legal Landscape.@ *The New York Times*, 11/25/01, p. 1, B4.
- Reid, T.R. 2001. **A**Europeans Reluctant to Send Terror Suspects to U.S.@ *The Washington Post*, 11/29/01, p. A3.
- Ricks, Thomas E. 2001. **A**Rumsfeld Warned Not To Cut Size Of Army.@ *The Washington Post*, 8/3/01, p. A8.
- Sanger, David E. 2001. **A**Bush Offers Arms Talks to China As U.S. Pulls Out of ABM Treaty.@ *The New York Times*, 12/14/01, p. 1, A12.
- Sanger, David E., and Patrick E. Tyler. 2001. **A**Wartime Forges A United Front for Bush Aides.@ *The New York Times*, 12/23/01, p. 1, B4.
- Schmitt, Eric. 2001. **A**Cheney Assembles Formidable Team.@ *The New York Times*, 2/3/01, p. 1,

A8.

- Schmitt, Eric. 2002. House G.O.P. Leader Warns Against Iraq Attack.@ *The New York Times*, 8/9/02, p. A6.
- Scowcroft, Brent. 2002. Don't Attack Saddam.@ *The Wall Street Journal*, 8/15/02, p. A12.
- Shanker, Thom. 2001. White House Says the U.S. Is Not a Loner, Just Choosy.@ *The New York Times*, 7/31/01, p. 1, A10.
- Sipress, Alan. 2001. Aggravated Allies Waiting for U.S. to Change Its Tunes@. *The Washington Post*, 4/22/01, p. A4.
- Smith, Dita. 2001. Going It Alone.@ *The Washington Post*, 8/4/01, p. A15.
- U.S. Congress. 2002. Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq.@ printed in *New York Times*, 10/12/02, p. A12.
- Washington Post*. 2002. Powell Aide Disputes Views on Iraq.@ 8/28/02, p. A16.
- Webb, James. 2002. Heading for Trouble.@ *The Washington Post*, 9/4/02, p. A21.
- Weisman, Steven R. 2002. History Lessons for Wartime Presidents and Their Generals.@ *The New York Times*, 9/15/02, p. wk14.